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Diminished Capacity Departures for Compulsive 
Gambling: Punishing the Pathological or Pardoning 
the Common Criminal? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 A grandmother from New York City was sentenced yesterday to 
31 months in federal prison and ordered to pay back the nearly 
$4.9 million she embezzled from her former employer to feed her 
gambling habit in Atlantic City.  
 . . .  
 From the judge, she asked for mercy. 
 To some extent, mercy had already been shown. 
 Checoura could have received substantially more prison time, 
but [the judge] agreed last month to apply a sparingly used portion 
of federal law to reduce her sentence. Her compulsive-gambling 
disorder, he ruled, “significantly impaired her ability to control her 
wrongful behavior.”1 
In 1998, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“Sentencing 
Guidelines” or “Guidelines”) were amended to explicitly include 
volitional impairments within the diminished capacity guideline.2 
Thus, the Sentencing Commission endorsed leniency for those 
defendants who, like Checoura, although fully capable of discerning 
right from wrong, are perceived as having an impaired ability to 
conform their behavior to the law. The compulsion is perceived as so 
great that it overpowers the will. Yet, mitigating punishment because 
of a perceived volitional impairment raises all the same concerns that 
led Congress to reject a volitional insanity defense,3 the primary 
concern being that it could not be “reliably administered . . . because 
of inherent problems with distinguishing those unable to conform to 
 
 1. Rita Giordano, Gambling Embezzler Gets 31 Months in U.S. Prison, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Jan. 4, 2002, at B5. 
 2. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13 (2001). 
 3. Insanity Defense Reform Act (IDRA), 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2000). 
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the law from those unwilling to do so.”4 This Comment will focus 
on that concern in the context of compulsive gambling5 as a factor 
for downward departure under the Sentencing Guidelines. Does a 
gambling addiction significantly reduce a person’s capacity to obey 
the law? Where does one draw the line between an inability to obey 
the law and failure to obey the law, between an irresistible impulse 
and an impulse not resisted? 
Section II will give a brief account of the Guidelines and the 
rationale for the departure guideline. Section III will discuss the 
correlation between compulsive gambling and crime. The evidence 
shows that compulsive gamblers commit crimes (particularly theft 
crimes) at higher rates than the general population. Thus, as greater 
access to gambling begets greater numbers of compulsive gamblers, 
how sentencing courts will treat compulsive gambling becomes more 
important. Section IV will discuss the different ways in which the 
diminished capacity guideline has been interpreted regarding 
volitional impairments and will suggest that a compromise approach 
fashioned by the Seventh Circuit should be followed. Section V will 
discuss the difficulties in measuring volitional impairments in general 
and compulsive gambling in particular and propose that the evidence 
shows that compulsive gambling does not in fact cause a diminished 
ability to obey the law. Finally, section VI will discuss the 
incompatibility of downward departures based on compulsive 
gambling with the Guidelines’ treatment of other factors, particularly 
drug and alcohol use and addiction. 
The conclusion of this Comment is that requests for downward 
departures based on compulsive gambling should not be granted. 
The reasons are twofold. First, there is little evidence that compulsive 
gambling causes diminished capacity and there is no reliable way of 
measuring it even if it does. Second, departures based on compulsive 
 
 4. Carlos M. Pelayo, Comment, “Give Me a Break! I Couldn’t Help Myself!”?: Rejecting 
Volitional Impairment as a Basis for Departure Under Federal Sentencing Guidelines Section 
5K2.13, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 735 n.29 (citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 228 (1983)). 
 5. The American Psychiatric Association describes pathological gambling as 
“[p]ersistent and recurrent maladaptive gambling behavior that disrupts personal, family, or 
vocational pursuits. The gambling pattern may be regular or episodic, and the course of the 
disorder is typically chronic.” AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 312.31 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV], http:// 
www.behavenet.com/capsules/disorders/pathgambledis.htm. This Comment uses the terms 
“pathological gambling,” “compulsive gambling,” and “gambling addiction” interchangeably, 
as does the case law. 
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gambling are inconsistent with the Guidelines’ policy goals and 
create a discrepancy with several Guidelines factors. Hopefully this 
Comment will call attention to serious problems, both in public 
policy toward gambling and in the difficult issues raised in punishing 
compulsive gamblers. Ultimately the goal is to neither punish the 
pathological nor pardon the common criminal. 
II. THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES: UNIFORMITY WITH FLEXIBILITY 
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA” or “Act”) grew out 
of a serious concern over “an unjustifiably wide range of sentences to 
offenders with similar histories, convicted of similar crimes, 
committed under similar circumstances.”6 The Act created a 
Sentencing Commission to establish sentencing guidelines to be 
followed by federal district court judges.7 The Guidelines’ goal was 
to create general uniformity while allowing flexibility for 
extraordinary circumstances.8 Thus, included in the SRA was a 
provision allowing judges to depart from the Guidelines under 
certain circumstances. “[T]he scope of the departure provision serves 
as the key battleground between those urging greater uniformity and 
those urging greater flexibility”9 in sentencing. 
 
 6. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996) (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38 
(1983)). 
 7. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Sentencing Reform Act in 
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1986). 
 8. Koon, 518 U.S. at 113. 
 9. Michael S. Gelacak et al., Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: An 
Empirical and Jurisprudential Analysis, 81 MINN. L. REV. 299, 318 (1996). The Sentencing 
Guidelines have been somewhat successful in creating uniformity within each appellate circuit, but 
the disparity between circuits is growing. In 2000, the Ninth Circuit departed downward in 37.9% 
of all cases while the Fourth Circuit departed downward in only 5.0% of all cases (both numbers 
exclude downward departures based on substantial assistance to the government). U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2000 DATAFILE, http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2000/table26.pdf (last visisted Feb. 
15, 2003). Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit has expressed concern that “[d]epartures are 
coming to be the norm rather than the exception. . . . It looks to me like we are inching toward a 
system very similar to the one in existence prior to the Guidelines, with broad sentencing discretion 
vested in the district court, and relatively little appellate review.” Alex Kozinski, Carthage Must be 
Destroyed, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 67, 67 (1999). It is natural for Judge Kozinski to feel this 
way, given that the Ninth Circuit is his perspective point; the Ninth Circuit has by far the highest 
rate of downward departure. “The goal of sentencing consistency cannot be well served when a 
defendant in the Ninth Circuit is nearly ten times more likely to benefit from a downward departure 
than a defendant in the Fourth Circuit.” Douglas A. Berman, Balanced and Purposeful Departures: 
Fixing a Jurisprudence That Undermines the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 76 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 21, 83–84 (2000). 
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Judges were not left without guidance in deciding when a 
departure might be appropriate. The Guidelines identify four 
categories of factors that might affect a departure decision.10 First, 
there are those few factors of which the Commission has forbidden 
consideration, including race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, 
socioeconomic status,11 lack of guidance as a youth,12 drug or alcohol 
dependence,13 and economic hardship.14 
Second, certain factors are discouraged as “not ordinarily 
relevant.”15 Discouraged factors include a defendant’s family ties and 
responsibilities,16 education and vocational skills,17 and military, civic, 
charitable, or public service record.18 Courts are also discouraged 
from departing downward based upon the defendant’s “mental and 
emotional conditions.”19 Discouraged factors should only be 
considered in “exceptional cases.”20 
Third, there are factors that the Commission encourages courts 
to consider.21 For example, downward departure is encouraged for 
victim provocation22 while upward departure is encouraged for 
disrupting a governmental function.23 Diminished capacity is listed 
among the encouraged factors, which are those the Commission 
“has not been able to take into account fully in formulating the 
guidelines.”24 
 
 10. As a general matter, departures are to serve the “basic purposes of criminal 
punishment: deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation.” U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(2) (2001). 
 11. Id. § 5H1.10. 
 12. Id. § 5H1.2. 
 13. Id. § 5H1.4. 
 14. Id. § 5K2.12. 
 15. Id. ch. 5, pt. H, introductory cmt. 
 16. Id. § 5H1.6. 
 17. Id. § 5H1.2. 
 18. Id. § 5H1.11. 
 19. Id. § 5H1.3 (states that section 5H1.3 does not apply to factors that fall under 
chapter 5 part K, which includes diminished capacity departures). 
 20. Id. ch. 5, pt. H, introductory cmt. 
 21. Id. § 5K2.0. 
 22. Id. § 5K2.10. 
 23. Id. § 5K2.7. In some instances, the relevant guideline will already have taken the 
encouraged factor into account, in which case it would be inappropriate to double count the 
factor unless it “is present to a degree substantially in excess of that which ordinarily is involved 
in the offense.” Id. § 5K2.0. 
 24. Id. § 5K2.0. 
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Finally, because the Sentencing Commission lacked perfect 
prospicience there are countless unmentioned factors which the 
sentencing court may take into account but only while considering 
the “structure and theory of both relevant individual guidelines and 
the Guidelines taken as a whole.”25 The Commission expected that 
departures based on grounds not mentioned in the Guidelines would 
be “highly infrequent.”26 
Compulsive gambling presents a particularly complex situation 
because it can implicate all four categories of departure factors. 
Compulsive gambling is unmentioned in the Guidelines and 
departures based on unmentioned factors were expected to be 
“highly infrequent.”27 Furthermore, compulsive gambling is 
considered an “emotional or mental condition[]” and thus could be 
a discouraged factor.28 Often times, those who commit crimes 
because they are compulsive gamblers do so because of personal 
financial difficulties, a forbidden factor.29 But, if compulsive 
gambling does in fact cause diminished capacity, it becomes an 
encouraged factor for downward departure.30 With all four departure 
factors implicated, courts are free to characterize compulsive 
gambling as they wish and either grant or deny the departure.31 
 
 25. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 26. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(4)(b). The Guidelines also 
allow for the possibility of an “extraordinary case that, because of a combination of . . . 
characteristics or circumstances, differs significantly from the ‘heartland’ cases covered by the 
guidelines in a way that is important to the statutory purposes of sentencing, even though 
none of the characteristics or circumstances individually distinguishes the case.” Id. § 5K2.0, 
cmt. Such cases, however, should be “extremely rare.” Id. Notwithstanding the Guidelines’ 
admonition that departures should be “highly infrequent,” the “overall national departure rate 
has been creeping steadily upward.” Frank O. Bowman, III, Fear of Law: Thoughts on Fear of 
Judging and the State of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 299, 341 
(2000). While uniformity has improved within federal circuits, there is less and less uniformity 
from circuit to circuit. Id. at 349. 
 27. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(4)(b). 
 28. Id. § 5H1.3 (“Mental and emotional conditions are not ordinarily relevant in 
determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range, except as 
provided in Chapter Five, Part K, Subpart 2 [which includes diminished capacity].”). 
 29. Id. § 5K2.12 (“The Commission considered the relevance of economic hardship 
and determined that personal financial difficulties . . . do not warrant a decrease in sentence.”). 
 30. Id. § 5K2.13 (“A sentence below the applicable guideline range may be warranted if 
the defendant committed the offense while suffering from a significantly reduced mental 
capacity.”). However, diminished capacity departures are forbidden if the offense was caused 
by voluntary use of drugs or alcohol, the defendant has a violent criminal history, or the crime 
involved violence or the threat of violence. Id. 
 31. Several departure factors involve similar contradictions. The Supreme Court in Koon 
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III. COMPULSIVE GAMBLING AND CRIME: CREATING  
A NEW CLASS OF CRIMINAL 
Widespread gambling is creating a new kind of criminal, as seen 
in newspaper stories across the country. For example, in Wisconsin, a 
fifty-seven-year-old grandmother was convicted for embezzling $1.2 
million from her employer over four years to pay for her gambling.32 
In Detroit, a twenty-seven-year-old elementary school teacher turned 
to bank robbery after she and her boyfriend contracted huge 
gambling debts at local casinos.33 The police said the teacher is one 
of a growing number of criminals turning to theft because of casino 
gambling debts.34 In New York City, a sixty-six-year-old 
 
v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), attempted to clarify departure jurisprudence by stating 
that questions of law, such as whether a certain factor can ever be considered under the 
Guidelines, should be reviewed on appeal under a de novo standard, but appellate courts 
otherwise should apply an abuse of discretion standard and give great deference to the 
traditional role of district courts in sentencing. However, the Court then overturned the 
district court on certain factual questions, thereby sending a mixed message. The failure of 
Koon to clarify departure jurisprudence has spawned much literature. See, e.g., Berman, supra 
note 9, at 80 (arguing that Koon has had “little substantive impact on the federal sentencing 
landscape other than to exacerbate doctrinal confusion and sentencing disparities in the realm 
of departures”); Deborah E. Dezelan, Departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines After 
Koon v. United States: More Discretion, Less Direction, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1679, 1716 
(1997) (“This ambiguity leads not only to a district court’s uncertainty about when it can 
legally depart, but also to inconsistent appellate review of departure decisions.”); Dana L. 
Shoenberg, Departures for Family Ties and Responsibilities After Koon, 9 FED. SENTENCING 
REP. 292 (1997) (“Despite its broad pronouncements about the deference due district courts, 
the Court in Koon refused to defer completely to the district court’s determination” that 
certain factors warranted departure.); Ian Weinstein, The Discontinuous Tradition of Sentencing 
Discretion: Koon’s Failure to Recognize the Reshaping of Judicial Discretion Under the 
Guidelines, 79 B.U. L. REV. 493, 526 (1999) (“Koon has changed the rhetoric of departure 
jurisprudence in the courts of appeals, but it has done little to change outcomes.”); id. at 516 
(“The contradictory strands within the Guidelines and the disagreement between the 
Commission and the Court about the degree of individualization appropriate under the 
Guidelines leave ample room for the circuit courts of appeals to go their own way, as they have 
since Koon was decided.”); see also Frank O. Bowman, III, Places in the Heartland: Departure 
Jurisprudence After Koon, 9 FED. SENTENCING REP. 19 (1996). 
 32. Woman Accused of $1.2 Million Theft From Employer Sentenced to Three Years in 
Prison, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 13, 2001. Some of the money was used for non-gambling 
purposes, such as purchasing a Harley-Davidson motorcycle. Id. 
 33. David Shepardson, Casino Losers Rob Banks, DETROIT NEWS, July 15, 2002, at A1. 
The teacher was sentenced to ten years in prison. Id. 
 34. Id. “‘We have seen an increase in the number of people who are robbing banks to 
pay gambling debts at the casinos,’ said Special Agent Terry Booth in Detroit.” Id. The 
newspaper story also reported on Samson Gemechu, who robbed two banks in Dearborn, 
Michigan, to pay for gambling losses; Richard Kozlow, a fifty-eight-year-old man who robbed 
eleven banks in ten states in a string of crimes authorities believe were gambling motivated; 
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grandmother embezzled $4.9 million from her employer to finance 
her gambling.35 Commenting on the case, Edward Looney of the 
Council on Compulsive Gambling of New Jersey stated that white-
collar crimes “run rampant because of compulsive gambling,” and 
that these criminals are generally “otherwise principled people, with 
good families, who have not been in trouble with the law before.”36 
A quick search reveals scores of similar stories.37 
 
Rita Radcliffe, who robbed a bank to gamble at a casino in Connecticut; Robert Kennedy, who 
robbed a bank and then fed the bills, covered with red dye from an anti-theft device, into a slot 
machine in Las Vegas; and Kimberly Carter, who robbed a bank in Michigan before going to a 
Detroit casino. Id. It is appropriate to note that none of these suspects would have been 
eligible for a downward departure because their crimes involved violence or the threat of 
violence. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13. 
 35. Giordano, supra note 1. 
 36. Id. The casinos deserve some of the blame. After realizing that Checoura was a big 
spender the casinos catered to her with free drinks and free meals along with free hotel rooms 
and credit and other enticements, even sending limousines all the way to New York City to 
pick her up for gambling trips and then taking her home for work the next day after gambling 
all night. Id. Checoura’s case also demonstrates the social impact of gambling. “In court 
yesterday, Norman Schoenfeld, president of S&S X-Ray, said Checoura’s theft had been ‘a 
major cause’ of the company’s closing its Brooklyn office. . . . [A]bout 190 employees had lost 
jobs.” Id. In fact, casinos and states receive large portions of their gambling revenues from 
compulsive gamblers. See infra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 37. See, e.g., Olwen Dudgeon, Trusted Friend Jailed For Stealing Estate, YORKSHIRE 
POST, June 27, 2002 (“A family friend, trusted to administer the estates of a widow and her 
son after they died, stole more than £38,000 and gambled the money away, a court heard. 
Much of the money was intended for charity.”); Stephen Hunt, Compulsive Gambler is Jailed 
for Theft, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 30, 1997, at B3 (“Mark Madsen’s descent from respected 
Salt Lake lawyer to convicted criminal dramatizes how addictions can ruin lives. Hooked on 
blackjack, Madsen stole more than $250,000 to repay debts to Nevada casinos.”); Heather 
Ratcliffe et al., Cashier for County Office is Accused of Stealing from Title Company, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 29, 2001, at A1 (“The head cashier for the St. Louis County recorder 
of deeds office was charged Wednesday with using her job to steal as much as $863,000 . . . . 
Investigators found evidence that King had several large gambling debts at casinos.”); Neil 
Roland, Medical Firm Sued Over Fraud Charge: SEC Targets Lauderdale Company, S. FLA. 
SUN-SENTINEL, June 8, 2001, at 1D (“A Florida medical company defrauded thousands of 
physicians and other investors of $52 million . . . . William J. Tishman, former principal 
owner . . . used $18 million of investor funds to pay gambling debts and personal expenses, the 
SEC’s lawsuit contended.”); Gambler Jailed for Swindling Sawmill, CHI. TRIB., July 25, 2001, 
at 8 (“A man who said he was a gambling addict was sentenced to 2 to 10 years in prison for 
defrauding a sawmill out of $1.2 million by selling phony lumber contracts for forest land he 
did not own or control.”); Lawyer Faces up to Nine Years, S.D. UNION-TRIB., Aug. 18, 2001, 
at A3. (“A lawyer once disbarred for stealing more than $260,000 from clients faces up to nine 
years in prison for cheating again. . . . [His wife] cooperated with prosecutors and told them 
that Basinger used the stolen money to pay gambling debts.”); Man Charged in Holdup of Gas 
Station, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 6, 2001, at 2B (“A man allegedly robbed a Waukesha 
gas station at knifepoint to help pay off a $20,000 gambling debt . . . . Police arrested Cagle 
later that morning at his job at a Milwaukee restaurant.”); School Embezzler Sent to Jail, 
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A. The Growing Prevalence of Compulsive Gambling 
Access to gambling is growing at an alarming rate. Between 
1975 and 1998, gambling industry gross revenues increased nearly 
1600%, reaching $50 billion.38 This $50 billion figure accounts only 
for legal gambling revenues.39 All but two states40 now have some 
forms of legalized gambling. 
As legalized gambling grows, so does the scourge of compulsive 
gambling. For example, in Minnesota probable pathological and 
problem gamblers increased from 2.5% of the adult population of the 
state in 1990 to 4.4% in 1994, nearly one in every twenty adults in 
the state.41 In Iowa, 1.7% of adults in the state were estimated as 
 
BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 10, 2002, at 26 (“A former school assistant business manager who was 
convicted of stealing $135,000 in merchandise from the school department to pay his 
gambling debts has been sent to jail for probation violations.”). 
 38. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION 1 [hereinafter 
NGISC], delivered to Congress June 18, 1999, available at http://www.npr.gov/ngisc/. 
Gross revenues are measured by taking the total amount of money spent on gambling and 
subtracting the amount paid out. In other words, it is the amount of money lost by gamblers. 
 39. Sports gambling is still illegal in every state but Nevada (and Oregon under a state-
run program for betting on National Football League games), but some estimate that as much 
as $25 billion to $100 billion a year is being illegally wagered. Lawrence S. Lustberg, 
Sentencing the Sick: Compulsive Gambling as the Basis for a Downward Departure Under the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 51, 51–52 (1992) (citing Special 
Report: Gambling, The Biggest Game in Town, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 10, 1986, at 30, 
32.) Internet gambling is also illegal, but Christiansen Capital Advisors, an industry specialist, 
estimated that Internet gambling revenue increased from $300 million in 1997 to over $1.1 
billion in 1999. John M. Barron et al., The Impact of Casino Gambling on Personal Bankruptcy 
Filing Rates, CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y, Oct. 1, 2002. Current estimates put industry profits at 
$5 billion. Liz Benston, Officials Debate Internet Gambling, LAS VEGAS SUN, June 28, 2002, 
at 3. Several major credit card companies have ceased allowing use of the cards on Internet 
gambling sites in response to lawsuits of people who maxed out credit cards and then refused 
to pay arguing that the credit card company should never have allowed them to use the cards 
for illegal activity. See, e.g., Citibank Has Agreed to Block Online Gambling Transactions, L.A. 
TIMES, June 15, 2002, at C2. 
 40. Hawaii and Utah still ban all forms of gambling. However, for residents of Utah, 
easy access to gambling is found just across the border in cities such as Wendover, Nevada ,and 
Mesquite, Nevada. Furthermore, the problem is not limited to the United States. “The 
expansion of gambling is a worldwide phenomenon. The establishment of lotteries, casinos 
and . . . electronic gambling devices are occurring on all continents. . . . Legal gambling issues, 
such as the resulting tax revenue and unforeseen social casts, are now common issues facing 
governments throughout the world.” MONTANA GAMBLING IN A NATIONAL AND GLOBAL 
CONTEXT 4 (Nov. 1998) [hereinafter 1998 MONT. GAMBLING STUDY], 
http://leg.state.mt.us/ 
reports/reference/past_interim/gsc98.html. 
 41. Id. Problem and pathological gamblers are determined by the South Oaks Gambling 
Screen (“SOGS”) which assigns points based on answers to gambling-related questions and 
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pathological gamblers in 1989 prior to the legalization of riverboat 
casinos, but that had increased to 5.4% by 1995.42 Other states that 
have conducted repeat studies have reached similar results.43 
Researchers in 1997 estimated that nationwide between 2.5 to 3.2 
million adults qualify as pathological gamblers at some point during 
their lifetime and 1.7 to 2.6 million qualified during the previous 
year.44 Among adolescents between ages twelve and eighteen, the 
number of pathological gamblers was estimated at 1.1 million.45 
Sadly, as budget deficits grow and the economy shrinks, gambling 
becomes a tempting source of revenue for legislators not wanting to 
raise taxes. As such, it is likely to expand even further.46 
 
then labels gamblers with scores above a certain threshold as probable problem gamblers or 
probable pathological gamblers. Id. at 21. 
 42. Joseph P. Shapiro et al., America’s Gambling Fever, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 
15, 1996, at 57. 
 43. The number of pathological gamblers in Montana increased from 2.2% of the adult 
population in 1992 to 3.6% in 1998. In Texas, the number increased from 2.5% in 1992 to 
3.0% in 1995. Of the states included in the study only South Dakota showed a drop—from 
1.4% in 1991 to 1.2% in 1993. Different states have conducted studies in different years with 
the highs ranging from 4.9% for probable problem and pathological gamblers in Mississippi in 
1996 to a low of 1.2% in South Dakota in 1993. 1998 MONT. GAMBLING STUDY, supra note 
40, at 22. 
 44. NGISC, supra note 38, at 8. 
 45. Id. Research also reveals that men and women gamble at about the same rate and 
wager at the same levels. 1998 MONT. GAMBLING STUDY, supra note 40, at 7 (citing J. Hrabra 
& G. Lee, Gender, Gambling and Problem Gambling, 12 J. GAMBLING STUD. 83 (1996)). 
 46. The growth in state lotteries is the best example of this phenomenon. See Valerie C. 
Lorenz, State Lotteries & Compulsive Gambling, 6 J. GAMBLING STUD. 383 (1990), cited in 
Lustberg, supra note 39, at 51 n.3. Just as alcohol and marijuana are often considered gateway 
drugs leading to more serious drug use, lotteries are often a gateway to more serious gambling 
problems. Many pathological gamblers first discover gambling through the lottery. See 
Lawrence Viele, State Lottery Has Cost Some Players Plenty, AUGUSTA CHRON., June 21, 1998, 
http://www.augustachronicle.com/stories/062198/met_lot2.shtml (Government is 
“benefiting from frivolous spending by the poor, and worse, making gambling for addicts as 
easy as buying a loaf of bread. . . . Some members [of Gamblers Anonymous] don’t blame the 
lottery for their addiction but say the game made it easier to gamble.”). Nevertheless, 
gambling is a tempting source of revenue for state governments because they are able to tax it 
at higher rates than other activities without overcoming the political pressure of raising taxes 
on consumers. However, gambling revenues are not the economic panacea that many believe. 
Lotteries are expensive to operate and, as the NGISC reported, they are highly regressive: 
Players with household incomes under $10,000 bet nearly three times as much on 
lotteries as those with incomes over $50,000. . . . And, since money is fungible and 
regular taxes are unpopular, research indicates that lotteries fall far short of their 
promise of extra spending for desirable programs. Close studies of spending in such 
areas as education and senior citizens’ programs suggest no increase due to the 
existence of lotteries. 
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B. Compulsive Gambling and Crime 
As gambling spreads and the number of compulsive gamblers 
grows, the number of crimes committed by compulsive gamblers will 
logically grow. In fact, research demonstrates that there is a clear 
connection between compulsive gambling and crime.47 
Gambling addicts often steal to support their habit or to pay off 
gambling debts. Thus, in diagnosing a compulsive gambling 
disorder, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
4th edition (“DSM-IV”), known as the “standard text of the 
American Psychiatric Association,” looks at whether the person “has 
committed illegal acts such as forgery, fraud, theft, or embezzlement 
to finance gambling.”48 Gamblers Anonymous asks twenty questions 
to determine if someone is a problem gambler, including “[h]ave 
you ever committed, or considered committing, an illegal act to 
finance gambling?”49 
 
NGISC, supra note 38, at 14. Richard C. Leone, a member of the National Gambling Impact 
Study Commission wrote: 
Lotteries, especially, seem to bring out the worst in politicians. They are heavily and 
misleadingly advertised; they pay back to bettors the smallest share of the take of any 
legal game; and they are an extremely regressive form of taxation, hitting hardest 
those with least ability to pay. Yet, lotteries have proven to be catnip for elected 
officials who fear taxation. 
Id. at 57. 
Further, most gambling simply transfers money from one sector of a state’s economy to 
another. The exceptions are those states, like Nevada and New Jersey, with “destination 
casinos” where tourists come to gamble. This of course damages the economy of states where 
such money might otherwise be spent and places pressure on them to allow destination 
casinos. It is in many ways a race to the bottom. 
 47. See, e.g., Lustberg, supra note 39, at 54 (citing Henry R. Lesieur & Richard J. 
Rosenthal, Pathological Gambling: A Review of the Literature Prepared for the American 
Psychological Association Task Force on DSM-IV Committee on Disorders of Impulse Control Not 
Elsewhere Classified, 7 J. OF GAMBLING STUD. 5, 24 (1991) (collecting studies regarding 
criminal activity among compulsive gamblers)) (“numerous studies have revealed the link 
between compulsive gambling and crime”). The Detroit News reports 
[a] seven-city research project by University of Nevada-Reno . . . found that each 
city had sharp increases in theft, domestic abuse and drug crimes after the opening 
of casinos. The cities also had an increase in personal bankruptcies. 
 . . .  
A separate study by University of Illinois economist Earl Grinols suggests that 
higher crime rates begin to appear three years after casinos open, perhaps because it 
takes chronic gamblers that long to exhaust their resources. 
Shepardson, supra note 33, at A1. 
 48. DSM-IV, supra note 5, at 312.31. 
 49. GAMBLERS ANONYMOUS, http://www.gamblersanonymous.org/20questions.html 
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Professor Henry R. Lesieur, a leading expert on the problems of 
pathological gambling, has done studies revealing that pathological 
gamblers commit crimes, including embezzlement and insurance 
fraud, far more often than non-gamblers.50 His 1995 survey of 
Gamblers Anonymous members in Illinois found that 46% admitted 
to some illegal act, including writing bad checks, stealing, or 
embezzling from their employer.51 A similar study in Wisconsin 
revealed that 49% had stolen to finance gambling and 39% had been 
arrested.52 In fact, the “American Insurance Institute has called 
gambling the main cause of white-collar crime.”53 
The “Gambling Impact and Behavior Study” commissioned by 
Congress through the National Gambling Impact Study Commission 
(“NGISC”) also showed a clear correlation between gambling 
addiction and crime. The study showed that “those with more 
gambling symptoms have much higher rates of lifetime arrests and 
imprisonment.”54 The study revealed, “Pathological and problem 
gamblers in treatment populations often reveal that they have stolen 
money or other valuables in order to gamble or pay for gambling 
debts.”55 A similar study commissioned by the State of Montana 
concluded that “pathological gamblers are more likely to be involved 
in crime and are more likely to be handled by the criminal justice 
system.”56 It is possible that the same factors in a person’s life that 
 
(last visited February 10, 2003). 
 50. NAT’L OPINION RESEARCH CTR. AT THE UNIV. OF CHI., GAMBLING IMPACT AND 
BEHAVIOR STUDY: REPORT TO THE NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION 47 
(April 1, 1999), http://www.norc.uchicago.edu/new/gambling.htm. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Wisbar, Resources for Wisconsin Attorneys and the Public, Gambling Addiction, 
http://www.wisbar.org/bar/gambling.html (last visited February 13, 2002). In Minnesota, 
for example, a growth in financial crimes has attended the explosion of gambling in the state: 
“[E]mployers are losing hundreds of thousands of dollars a year to gambling-related thefts by 
employees.” Dennis J. McGrath & Chris Ison, Gambling Spawns a New Breed of Criminal, 
STAR TRIB., Dec 4, 1995, at 1A. Judges and prosecutors in Michigan have reported an increase 
“in theft and embezzlement cases, many arising from problem gambling.” Rising Crime 
Blamed on Gambling, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 1, 2000. A U.S. News & World Report 
analysis found that crime rates in casino cities are 84% higher than the national average, and 
that while crime rates dropped nationally in 1994, in thirty-one communities that introduced 
casinos crime increased by 7.7%. Shapiro, supra note 42, at 58. 
 54. NAT’L OPINION RESEARCH CTR., supra note 50, at 47. 
 55. Id.  
 56. 1998 MONT. GAMBLING STUDY, supra note 40, at 29. 
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lead to gambling may also lead to crime, but whatever factors lead 
them there, compulsive gamblers commit crimes far more often than 
do others.57 
However, while compulsive gamblers commit crimes more 
frequently than the population as a whole, this fact does not answer 
the question whether the gambling addiction in fact decreases their 
ability to obey the law or merely gives them a more powerful motive 
to steal. That is a question that psychologists have been unable to 
answer clearly, but much evidence suggests that compulsive gamblers 
do not lose their ability to obey the law.58 
With this backdrop, the rest of this Comment will analyze three 
issues: (1) whether a proper interpretation of the Guidelines permits 
compulsive gambling to be a factor for departure when the crime 
committed is not a gambling-related offense, and if so, what the link 
must be between the gambling addiction and the crime; (2) whether 
the difficulty in diagnosing and measuring compulsive gambling 
mitigates against its use as a factor for downward departure; and (3) 
whether downward departures based on compulsive gambling are 
consistent with the Guidelines’ treatment of other factors. 
IV. THE DIMINISHED CAPACITY GUIDELINE 
The diminished capacity guideline states that a sentence below 
the applicable guideline range may be appropriate “if the defendant 
committed the offense while suffering from a significantly reduced 
mental capacity.”59 If the judge finds that departure is appropriate, 
“the extent of the departure should reflect the extent to which the 
reduced mental capacity contributed to the commission of the 
offense.”60 However, departure is not allowed if: (1) the significantly 
reduced mental capacity was caused by the voluntary use of drugs or 
other intoxicants; (2) the crime involved violence or a serious threat 
of violence; or (3) the criminal history of the offender reveals that 
 
 57. The social impacts of gambling are not limited to crime. “Such costs include 
unemployment benefits, welfare benefits, physical and mental health problems, theft, 
embezzlement, bankruptcy, suicide, domestic violence, and child abuse and neglect.” NGISC, 
supra note 38, at 16. 
 58. See infra Part V.A–B. 
 59. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13 (2001). Diminished capacity 
departures are an exception to the rule that “mental and emotional conditions are not 
ordinarily relevant” to determining a sentencing departure. Id. § 5H1.3. 
 60. Id. § 5K2.13. 
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there is a need for incarceration to protect the public.61 The purpose 
of this guideline is to make punishment comport with culpability—
mitigating punishment for defendants who, while not legally insane, 
deserve less punishment because of some condition that society views 
as making the defendant less culpable. 
Before the diminished capacity guideline was amended in 1998, 
some courts had held that “significantly reduced mental capacity” 
included a volitional as well as a cognitive prong. In 1998, the 
Sentencing Commission, recognizing this split, amended the 
guideline to recognize volitional impairments.62 In the amendment, 
the Commission defined significantly reduced mental capacity as a 
“significantly impaired ability to (A) understand the wrongfulness of 
the behavior comprising the offense or to exercise the power of 
reason; or (B) control behavior that the defendant knows is 
wrongful.”63 Definition (A) covers cognitive impairments and gives a 
defendant the excuse that he did not understand that the criminal act 
he was committing was wrong. Definition (B) covers volitional 
impairments and allows the defendant to argue that while he knew 
the behavior was wrong, he was unable to control his actions. This 
Comment is concerned only with Definition (B).64 Section A below 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. The Sentencing Commission adopted the definition of significantly reduced mental 
capacity that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals promulgated in United States v. McBroom, 124 
F.3d. 533 (3d Cir. 1997). Originally, in United States v. Hamilton, 949 F.2d 190, 193 (6th Cir. 
1991), the court rejected a downward departure based on a gambling addiction, noting that the 
defendant “was able to absorb information in the usual way and to exercise the power of reason,” 
thereby rejecting the notion that the diminished capacity guideline included volitional impairments. 
In McBroom, however, the Third Circuit overturned similar reasoning by the district court and found 
that the phrase “reduced mental capacity” included an inability to conform one’s actions to the 
requirements of the law. 124 F.3d at 546. This debate is not a new one. M’Naghten’s Rule was 
criticized because it did not allow for a volitional element but was limited to cognitive impairments. 
See ANDRE A. MOENSSENS ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 970 (6th ed. 1998). The Model Penal Code 
included a volitional prong to supplement M’Naghten’s Rule: “A person is not responsible for 
criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks 
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to 
the requirements of law.” Id. at 544. However, in the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 
Congress “deleted the ‘volitional prong’ of the insanity defense.” Id. at 545 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 17 
(1984)). 
 63. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13, cmt. n.1 (2001). 
 64. The amendment became effective on November 1, 1998. The original guideline 
read: 
If the defendant committed a non-violent offense while suffering from significantly 
reduced mental capacity not resulting from voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants, 
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will discuss the interpretations that have been given to the 
diminished capacity guideline, including some of the concerns with 
each interpretation. Section B will briefly argue that the compromise 
interpretation is most in conformity with the purpose of the 
volitional impairment guideline. 
A. Interpreting the Diminished Capacity Guideline 
Three different approaches have been taken toward the 
diminished capacity guideline for volitional impairments. First, some 
assert that the language of the guideline requires that for a volitional 
impairment to be an appropriate factor for departure, the defendant 
must have an inability to control the behavior constituting the 
offense.65 In other words, for compulsive gambling to be a factor for 
departure, the underlying crime would have to be a gambling 
offense, not collateral behavior that enables the gambling. 
Compulsive gambling, this argument proposes, creates an 
uncontrollable urge to gamble, not to steal. A second interpretation 
requires merely that the gambling addiction provide a motive for the 
offense.66 As long as the crime is explained by the compulsive 
gambling, a sort of but-for test, the defendant can be granted a 
downward departure. The third interpretation focuses on whether 
the volitional impairment actually impaired the defendant’s ability to 
resist the crime in question rather than merely provided a motive for 
the crime, though the crime does not necessarily have to be directly 
related to gambling or be a gambling offense.67 In other words, 
merely establishing that a person embezzled money because he was a 
compulsive gambler is not enough. Expert testimony would have to 
 
a lower sentence may be warranted to reflect the extent to which reduced mental 
capacity contributed to the commission of the offense, provided that the defendant’s 
criminal history does not indicate a need for incarceration to protect the public. 
Id. § 5K2.13 (1995) (amended 1998). 
 65. See, e.g., United States v. Carucci, 33 F. Supp. 2d 302, 302–03 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(rejecting request for downward departure based on gambling addiction and stating that “a 
compulsive gambler is not, a fortiori, a compulsive illegal trader”). 
 66. See, e.g., United States v. Sadolsky, 234 F.3d 938, 943 (6th Cir. 2000) (granting a 
departure based on compulsive gambling and holding that the guideline does not distinguish 
between diminished capacity “that explain[s] the behavior that constituted the crime . . . [or] 
that explain[s] the behavior that motivated the crime”). 
 67. See, e.g., United States v. Roach, 296 F.3d 565 (7th Cir. 2002) (denying downward 
departure based on addiction to shopping where defendant did not show diminished ability to 
obey the law). 
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establish that the compulsive gambling significantly impaired the 
defendant’s ability to act within the law. There is no clear majority 
approach. 
1. Interpreting the guideline to require a direct link 
The most rigid reading of the diminished capacity guideline 
would disallow a court from departing downward based on a 
gambling addiction when the underlying crime was not a gambling 
offense. This approach seems to have been the controlling 
construction in United States v. Carucci,68 where the defendant, a 
floor broker at the New York Stock Exchange, had engaged in illegal 
trading to support his compulsive gambling disorder.69 The court 
rejected his request for downward departure stating that if his crime 
were unlawful gambling he would have a colorable argument, but “a 
compulsive gambler is not, a fortiori, a compulsive illegal trader.”70 
This interpretation is arguably required by the Guidelines’ 
definition of significantly reduced mental capacity. The definition 
reads 
“Significantly reduced mental capacity” means the defendant, 
although convicted, has a significantly impaired ability to (A) 
 
 68. 33 F. Supp. 2d 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 302–03. Some cases decided before the 1998 amendment required a direct 
link. In Venezia v. United States, 884 F. Supp. 919 (D.N.J. 1995), another compulsive 
gambling case, the court held that there must be a direct connection between the reduced 
mental capacity and the crime committed: “It is true that [the defendant’s] gambling losses 
resulted in large debts, and that his indebtedness provided additional motivation to continue 
and expand his fraudulent operations,” but “a more compelling motive to defraud is not the 
kind of direct causation between mental capacity and commission of the offense envisioned by 
§ 5K2.13.” Id. at 926. Similarly, in United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 1998), 
the court noted that collateral behavior which enables compulsive behavior is not sufficiently 
linked to the volitional impairment to merit a departure. In Miller, the court overturned a 
downward departure based on the defendant’s compulsive attraction to adult pornography 
where the defendant had traded in child pornography in order to gather more adult 
pornography. The court found that 
at most, the defendant’s impulse disorder was related to his viewing of adult 
pornography and acting out sexually with adults, and that his offense conduct was 
no more related to the impulse disorder than if he had robbed someone in order to 
use the proceeds to purchase adult pornography. The impulse was related to viewing 
pornography, but was not related to the means of obtaining the pornography. 
Id. at 1286. Expert testimony in the case had established only his compulsion to view adult 
pornography but “failed to establish that the disorder caused him to trade child pornography, 
which is the offense for which he was being sentenced.” Id. 
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understand the wrongfulness of the behavior comprising the offense 
or to exercise the power of reason [(cognitive)]; or (B) control 
behavior that the defendant knows is wrongful [(volitional)].71 
Cognitive impairment departures are explicitly limited to cases in 
which the defendant’s impairment prevents him from understanding 
the wrongfulness of the behavior “comprising the offense.”72 The 
volitional impairment clause uses the same words, “wrongful” and 
“behavior.”73 There is no indication that the Sentencing 
Commission intended wrongful behavior to be limited to the 
behavior constituting the offense for cognitive impairments but did 
not intend the same for volitional impairments. After all, the 
definition comprises a single sentence. It is an axiom of judicial 
interpretation that the same or similar language used in close 
proximity is construed to mean the same thing.74 
However, the opposite could also be the correct construction. 
The fact that the Commission used such explicit language respecting 
cognitive impairments but did not repeat the restriction in the 
subsequent clause defining volitional impairments could indicate that 
the Commission did not desire to inhibit volitional impairments in 
the same manner as cognitive impairments. Limiting cognitive 
impairments in this manner but not volitional impairments makes 
sense considering the nature of the impairments. If the defendant 
understands the wrongfulness of the behavior comprising the 
offense, mitigation based on a cognitive impairment would be 
inappropriate because the defendant was not cognitively impaired. 
However, it is possible that a defendant with a volitional impairment, 
such as compulsive gambling, may have an impaired ability to 
control behavior collateral to gambling which nonetheless enables 
his gambling. 
 
 
 
 71. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13, cmt. n.1 (2001) (emphasis 
added). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at n.1(B). 
 74. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177 (1993) (When a word is used twice 
in the same phrase it is “reasonable to give each use a similar construction.”). 
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2. Behavior that motivates the crime 
The strict interpretation above was rejected in United States v. 
Sadolsky.75 Sadolsky was a regional manager for Sears Roebuck who, 
over a period of six months, credited returned merchandise to his 
own credit card (collateral behavior) in order to pay gambling debts 
in the amount of $30,000.76 At sentencing, Sadolsky’s request for a 
downward departure under section 5K2.13 due to his gambling 
addiction was granted.77 On appeal, the government argued that the 
departure was improper because the underlying crime was not a 
gambling offense.78 The Sixth Circuit rejected the government’s 
argument stating, “[s]ection 5K2.13 does not distinguish between 
[volitional impairments] that explain the behavior that constituted 
the crime charged and [volitional impairments] that explain the 
behavior that motivated the crime. . . . 5K2.13 does not require a 
direct causal link between the [volitional impairment] and the crime 
charged.”79 The court offered little justification for this cursory 
statement. More troubling, the court never addressed whether 
Sadolsky’s gambling problem in fact impaired his ability to obey the 
law, a different question from whether the gambling problem 
 
 75. 234 F.3d 938 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 76. Id. at 940. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 942–43. 
 79. Id. at 943. Other than this cursory statement, the court never addressed the 
government’s proposed interpretation of the Guidelines or why the Commission would limit 
cognitive impairments to behavior “comprising the offense” but not do the same with respect 
to volitional impairments. Nor did the court determine what “behavior that the defendant 
knows is wrongful,” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13, cmt. n.1 (2001), 
would be if it is not the behavior constituting the offense. The court in Sadolsky cites United 
States v. Harris, 1994 WL 683429 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), a case decided before the amendment was 
added to the Guidelines defining significantly reduced mental capacity. In Harris, the judge 
specifically refused to address the question of causation because he found that the defendant 
failed to prove he had a pathological gambling disorder. Sadolsky also cited McBroom for the 
proposition that section 5K2.13 does not distinguish between behavior that constitutes the 
crime and behavior that motivates the crime. However, in McBroom, the volitional impairment 
(an addiction to all manner of pornography) was directly related to the crime (possession of 
child pornography). United States v. McBroom, 124 F.3d 533 (3d Cir. 1997). Finally, the 
court in Sadolsky also cites United States v. Cantu, 12 F.3d 1506, 1515 (9th Cir. 1993), for 
the proposition that a significantly reduced mental capacity need only be a contributing cause 
and not the sole or but-for cause of the crime. However, this begs the question whether the 
volitional impairment was directly related to the offense and lends nothing to an interpretation 
of the diminished capacity guideline. Cantu was also decided five years before the guideline 
was amended. 
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motivated the crime.80 Nevertheless, Sadolsky has been followed by 
other courts.81 
The Sixth Circuit also believed the strict interpretation could 
lead to arbitrary results. For example, the Sixth Circuit noted that 
under the government’s proposed interpretation “if someone with an 
eating disorder stole food, he or she would be entitled to a 
downward departure. . . . If, however, that same person stole money 
to buy food, he or she would not be entitled to a downward 
departure.”82 This analogy at least partially misses the point of the 
strict interpretation. The proffered interpretation would in fact 
prohibit departures where the defendant either stole food or stole 
money to buy food. An inability to resist the desire to eat does not 
automatically lead to an inability to resist the desire to steal food or 
to steal money to buy food.83 Many people with compulsions would 
nonetheless refuse to steal even if necessary to support their habit. It 
may be that those who do steal under such circumstances simply 
have fewer compunctions about doing so, not that their compulsion 
to eat is any greater than those who refuse to steal. The difference 
could be one of morality, not compulsion.84 
 
 80. One of the inherent difficulties with volitional impairments is the lack of clear 
standards for determining when they exist. Sadolsky’s behavior occurred over several months 
and involved detailed planning, yet the court accepted the proposition that, because of a 
compulsive gambling disorder, Sadolsky could not help himself. Further, Sadolsky did not steal 
the money to gamble but rather stole it to pay off his gambling debts. The court never 
addressed how its decision could be squared with the Guidelines’ prohibition of departures 
based on economic hardship. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.12. 
 81. See, e.g., United States v. Checoura, 176 F. Supp. 2d 310 (D.N.J. 2001) (upholding 
downward departure where pathological gambling motivated transportation of stolen 
property); United States v. Ming, 2001 WL 1631874 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (finding downward 
departure for compulsive gambling that motivates crime appropriate but finding insufficient 
connection under facts presented). 
 82. Sadolsky, 234 F.3d at 943. 
 83. The court in United States v. Davis, 772 F.2d 1339, 1347 (7th Cir. 1985), said: 
[I]t does not seem to us enough to show that gambling is compulsive, . . . money is 
necessary for gambling and therefore the stealing of money is equally “compulsive.” 
The stealing may follow as a matter of logic or means-end reasoning but this in itself 
should not necessarily result in a psychiatric characterization of the act of stealing as 
“compulsive.” 
 84. In fact, as the statistics cited in Part III above demonstrate, a large number of 
compulsive gamblers have resisted the compulsion to steal to continue their gambling habit, 
many by choosing to get professional help instead. A classic criminal law case perhaps illustrates 
this point. Four men are stranded on a boat with nothing to eat; they are starving and near 
death. There is little doubt that if food were placed before them they could hardly resist its 
temptation. Three of the men decide to cast lots to see which of the men will be killed for the 
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This is not the first time these issues have been raised. Numerous 
defendants attempted to use compulsive gambling as an insanity 
defense in cases where the underlying offense was not gambling 
related but was motivated by a gambling disorder. The volitional 
insanity cases unanimously rejected testimony of compulsive 
gambling under the volitional prong of the insanity defense where 
the underlying crime was not a gambling offense. These cases 
generally state, for example, that “there does not exist the requisite 
nexus between compulsive gambling and non-gambling offenses 
generally. . . for a compulsive gambling disorder to serve as the basis 
of an insanity defense to such offenses.”85 
However, the purpose of the diminished capacity guideline is to 
mitigate punishment, not eliminate it. Thus, the guideline provides 
that the reduction in sentence should reflect the degree to which the 
volitional impairment contributed to the commission of the 
offense.86 That the volitional impairment motivated the offense 
should not be enough, nor should it matter if the behavior was 
collateral to the volitional impairment. The critical issue is whether 
the volitional impairment in fact diminished the defendant’s ability 
to control his behavior, whether collateral or not. This is not to say 
that whether or not the offense behavior was a gambling-related 
offense is irrelevant. As the volitional insanity compulsive gambling 
cases demonstrate, “a compulsion to gamble, even if a mental disease 
or defect, is not, ipso facto, relevant to the issue whether the 
 
other to eat so that the others may survive. The fourth man, whose compulsion to eat is just as 
great as the others; refuses to participate because of moral qualms the others do not share to 
the same degree. The difference between the men is not one of compulsion, but of morality. 
See Lon Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949). 
 85. United States v. Carmel, 801 F.2d 997, 999 (7th Cir. 1986); see also United States 
v. Davis, 772 F. 2d 1339, 1347 (7th Cir. 1985) (refusing to allow evidence of compulsive 
gambling where defendant had failed to show acceptance among scientific community that 
“compulsive gambling involves in some persons the inability to conform their conduct to the 
laws prohibiting check forgery” and noting that the district court would have allowed the 
evidence if the offense charged was a gambling offense); United States v. Gould, 741 F. 2d 45, 
48 (4th Cir. 1984) (agreeing with Lewellyn and Torniero in rejecting compulsive gambling “as 
the basis for an insanity defense to criminal offenses collateral to gambling”); United States v. 
Torniero, 735 F.2d 725, 732 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[A] compulsion to gamble, even if a mental 
disease or defect, is not, ipso facto, relevant to the issue whether the defendant was unable to 
restrain himself from non-gambling offenses such as transporting stolen property.”); United 
States v. Lewellyn, 723 F. 2d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1983) (rejecting testimony of compulsive 
gambling where defendant failed to show general acceptance of the theory that “pathological 
gamblers lack substantial capacity to refrain from committing embezzlement”). 
 86. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13. 
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defendant was unable to restrain himself from non-gambling 
offenses.”87 Thus, courts should be wary of requests for downward 
departure when the offense behavior is not directly related to the 
pathological problem. 
3. The Roach approach 
An intermediate approach was fashioned in United States v. 
Roach88 when the court agreed with Sadolsky that the diminished 
capacity guideline does not distinguish between direct and indirect 
causes but also noted that “understanding the defendant’s motive 
does not necessarily reveal anything about the defendant’s mental 
capacity at the time of the offense.”89 This approach is a much more 
fact-specific inquiry, as the analysis in Roach demonstrates. 
Roach suffered from chronic depression and compulsively 
shopped to relieve her depression. She embezzled more than 
$240,000 from her employer by submitting false expense reports, 
not because she needed the money to shop, but to hide the 
shopping expenses from her husband.90 In fact, she had shopped 
compulsively for years without committing theft of any kind. The 
embezzlement began when Roach submitted an expense report for 
conference registration fees that she had placed on her personal 
credit card.91 When she was unable to attend the conference, the fees 
were refunded but not until after her employer had already 
reimbursed her.92 Roach continued to submit false expense reports 
until she was caught. After Roach pled guilty, the trial court, citing 
Sadolsky, granted her a downward departure based on her compulsive 
shopping disorder.93 
 
 
 87. Torniero, 735 F.2d at 732. 
 88. 296 F.3d 565 (7th Cir. 2002). Roach is a compulsive shopping case, not a 
compulsive gambling case; however, the use of Roach here is meant to demonstrate a proper 
interpretation of the diminished capacity volitional impairment guideline. Since compulsive 
shopping is a volitional impairment, the use of Roach here seems appropriate. 
 89. Id. at 570. “We agree with the government that § 5K2.13 requires more than a 
connection between the impairment and the motive.” Id. at 569. 
 90. Id. at 566–67. In fact, she and her husband combined earned more than $300,000 
a year. 
 91. Id at 567. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 567–68. 
STA-FIN 2/15/2003 2:59 PM 
385] Diminished Capacity Departures for Compulsive Gambling 
 405 
At the sentencing hearing, several psychiatrists testified as to 
Roach’s compulsive shopping, but none clearly established her 
inability to control her fraudulent “conduct at the time of her 
offense.”94 The first psychiatrist testified that compulsive shoppers 
often “commit illegal acts . . . to finance their illness.”95 The Seventh 
Circuit, in overturning the departure, rejected the testimony, noting 
that “missing from [the psychiatrist’s] statement is any conclusion 
that this aspect of the disorder even applies to Roach or, if it did, any 
assessment of the role it played at the time of her offense.”96 
The second psychiatrist testified that during her criminal activity 
Roach was “functioning in a dissociated state in which information 
about the legal, practical and moral consequences of her actions was 
not effectively available to her.”97 The appellate court also rejected 
this testimony because of “Roach’s own statements that she began 
the fraud after inadvertently discovering that she could”98 and not 
because of an overwhelming compulsion. Because of the “episodic 
nature of her impairment, and the fact that Roach had ‘self-
medicated’ her depression and compulsively shopped for more than 
ten years without any criminal activity,”99 the court found a lack of 
evidence supporting a diminished capacity to control fraudulent 
behavior.100 
The third psychiatrist was similarly unhelpful. His “only 
observation about Roach’s offense conduct—that she defrauded her 
employer in an attempt to hide her behaviors—tends to undermine, 
rather than support, a finding that Roach had a significantly impaired 
capacity to control her conduct at the time of the offense.”101 In the 
end, the appellate court overturned the departure because the 
findings on Roach’s motives did not “establish the critical issue of 
her mental capacity at the time of the offense.”102 The court found 
that “the analytic leap from a shopping compulsion to a significantly 
impaired ability to control fraudulent conduct spanning three years is 
 
 94. Id. at 571–73. 
 95. Id. at 572. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 573. 
 102. Id. 
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too great to make”103 where the defendant had clearly demonstrated 
the capacity for self-control. 
Roach had suffered from compulsive shopping most of her adult 
life. She did not become a thief until the opportunity serendipitously 
presented itself and then she did so only to hide the activity from her 
husband—not because she could not help herself.104 Thus, while 
Roach almost certainly would not have stolen the money “but-for” 
her shopping compulsion, such a motive alone was not enough to 
overcome the fact that she had managed to avoid such criminal 
activity for years before turning to crime. The court focused on the 
critical question of the diminished capacity guideline, whether 
Roach’s ability to obey the law was significantly diminished because 
of her volitional impairment. 
B. Following the Roach Approach 
The approach taken by the Seventh Circuit in Roach is the most 
consistent with the Guidelines. First, it focuses on the primary 
question of diminished capacity—whether the defendant in fact had 
a significantly impaired ability to resist his unlawful behavior. 
Second, it does not rely on the type of crime involved, as would the 
strict approach discussed above, but it does exercise caution towards 
a request for downward departure based on behavior collateral to the 
compulsion. 
The Roach approach is also most in line with the policy of the 
diminished capacity guideline to ease the punishment of those who 
lack substantial capacity to control their behavior and mete out 
punishment to reflect the level of culpability, regardless of the 
underlying crime. The Sadolsky approach, on the other hand, is 
dangerous both to the goal of uniformity and to the policy of the 
Guidelines. Compulsive behavior motivates any number of crimes, 
and every sentencing judge “could have his or her own view of an 
unlimited array of pathologies as being the cause of the particular 
criminal behavior.”105 Furthermore, establishing motive does not 
 
 103. Id. at 572–73. 
 104. The Seventh Circuit even hinted that such a holding otherwise might conflict with 
the Guidelines’ prohibition of departures based on personal financial difficulties and economic 
pressure but withheld judgment on that issue because it was not before the court. Id. at 571 
n.4 (citing United States v. Sadolsky, 234 F.3d 938 (6th Cir. 2000)). 
 105. United States v. Jones, No. 01 CR 457, 2002 WL 449014, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
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clarify the critical question of culpability, whether the impulse was 
irresistible or just not resisted. 106 
Roach also raises several questions that are appropriate in the 
compulsive gambling context. For example, the court may want to 
know whether the defendant had expended all of his own resources 
and had only turned to theft as a last resort and the only means of 
satisfying the compulsion to gamble. The court would also want to 
know the circumstances that led to the theft. Was it indeed the 
desperate act of a compulsive gambler or simply an opportunity that 
unexpectedly presented itself? Had the defendant demonstrated the 
capacity for self-control? Was the motive in committing the theft in 
fact to satisfy a compulsive need to gamble, or was it to hide the 
gambling from a spouse, or even to pay off a gambling debt? The 
court may also want to know whether the defendant had ever stolen 
before he began to gamble, suggesting he may simply be a thief who 
happens to have a gambling problem. Finally, the court would want 
to know how long the defendant gambled before committing the 
theft. The fact that the gambling had continued for some time 
without the defendant turning to crime may suggest that the 
defendant did in fact have the capacity to control his criminal 
behavior.107 Most importantly, the court must determine whether 
compulsive gambling causes diminished capacity. As the next section 
makes clear, that is not an easy question. 
V. COMPULSIVE GAMBLING AND DIMINISHED CAPACITY 
The above section discussed the proper interpretation of the 
diminished capacity guideline for volitional impairments. However, 
“[a] court only gets to [the guideline] when it has determined that 
 
 106. For example, imagine a compulsive gambler sitting at a slot machine who sees a 
$100 bill hanging out of the pocket of the man sitting next to him. The compulsive gambler 
still has plenty of money of his own, and has never stolen before, but realizes that if he takes 
this money he can hide his gambling from his wife, so he takes it. The theft is clearly motivated 
by his gambling addiction, but was it uncontrollable? He would have been able to satisfy his 
need to gamble without the money. Or imagine that he took the money, not to gamble, but to 
buy groceries on the way home because he had gambled away the grocery money. Does the 
theft still satisfy a compulsive need to gamble? 
 107. However, it may also be true that while the defendant resisted the compulsion to 
steal to support his habit for quite some time, at some point the compulsion may have 
worsened to the point that resisting became more difficult. Thus, the fact that he was able to 
resist for a time does not fully answer the question of whether, at the time of the offense, the 
defendant was still fully capable of resisting. 
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the defendant suffers from a diminished capacity.”108 A gambling 
addiction gives a defendant a powerful motive for the crime, but 
there is little evidence it creates a lack of willpower greater than that 
exhibited by most criminals. Section A below makes a comparison 
with the volitional insanity defense and notes that compulsive 
gambling was generally rejected as a volitional impairment for 
insanity purposes because of a lack of evidence that it weakened the 
will of the individual. Section B will discuss some of the psychiatric 
evidence associated with compulsive gambling. 
A. Compulsive Gambling Under the Volitional Insanity Defense 
Following the acquittal of John Hinckley in 1982 for the 
attempted murder of President Reagan, a movement began to 
modify the insanity defense.109 The American Psychiatric Association 
had called for removal of the “volitional prong” from the insanity 
defense.110 The American Bar Association also supported ridding the 
criminal law of volitional impairment insanity.111 In 1984, Congress 
passed legislation eliminating the volitional prong from the federal 
insanity defense.112 The primary reason for this was the impossibility 
of distinguishing between those “unable to conform to the law from 
those unwilling to do so.”113 
 
 
 108. United States v. Walter, 256 F.3d 891, 895 n.5 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 109. MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 62, at 1010; see also Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the 
Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 777 (1985). 
 110. United States v. Torniero, 735 F.2d 725, 727 n.4 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting 
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION STATEMENT ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE, at 12 
(1982), reprinted in 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 681 (1983)). 
 111. Torniero, 735 F.2d at 727 n.4 (quoting AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION POLICY ON 
THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1983)). 
 112. The Insanity Defense Reform Act (IDRA), 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1984) states: 
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that, at the 
time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a 
result of severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and 
quality of the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise 
constitute a defense. 
The IDRA not only rejected volitional impairments but also placed the burden of proving 
insanity on the defendant. Id. An Oregon statute placing the burden on the defendant was 
challenged on due process grounds but was upheld by the Supreme Court in Leland v. Oregon, 
343 U.S. 790 (1952). Leland also found that the “irresistible impulse” test is not “implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty and thus not found in the due process clause.” Id. at 801. 
 113. Pelayo, supra note 4, at 735 n.29 (citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 228 (1983)). 
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Perhaps the greatest difficulty with volitional impairments is 
there is no established means of measuring them. The Fifth Circuit, 
in rejecting volitional insanity, noted that “a majority of psychiatrists 
now believe that they do not possess sufficient accurate scientific 
bases for measuring a person’s capacity for self-control or for 
calibrating the impairment of that capacity.”114 The American 
Psychiatric Association agreed: “The line between an irresistible 
impulse and an impulse not resisted is probably no sharper than 
between twilight and dusk.”115 
Criminals as a class have generally exhibited a lack of will power. 
This was noted in United States v. Jones,116 where the court rejected a 
motion for downward departure in an embezzlement case involving 
a bank teller who was a compulsive gambler and needed the money 
to support her habit.117 The court found little difference between her 
and other criminals. “Need, real or perceived, is at the root of many 
types of crimes, especially embezzlements.”118 When presented with 
the opportunity to steal 
there will almost always be a need, “compulsive” or “pathological,” 
to steal so long as the teller has an attitude that tolerates theft or 
other criminal or antisocial behavior. If a defendant could qualify 
for a downward departure by showing that a compulsive disorder 
provided his motive, then virtually all embezzlements could be 
excused to some degree, as caused by a need for money to gamble, 
carry on an affair, or to live a more lavish lifestyle.119 
Compulsive gambling consistently failed as an insanity claim.120 
In fact, care was taken in defining compulsive gambling to ensure 
that it would not qualify as volitional insanity. Thus, the DSM-III, 
the first psychiatric manual to include compulsive gambling as an 
 
 114. United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 1984); see also Pelayo, supra 
note 4, at 735 n.29 (“It seems clear from the legislative history that Congress’s main concern 
in passing the IDRA was that the volitional insanity defense cannot be reliably administered at 
trial, because of inherent problems with distinguishing those unable to conform to the law 
from those unwilling to do so.”). 
 115. Lyons, 731 F.2d at 248 (quoting AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION 
STATEMENT ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE, supra note 110, at 11). 
 116. 2002 WL 449014 (2002). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at *2. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See infra note 121 and accompanying text. 
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impulse control disorder, purposely defined the disorder as a “failure 
to resist rather than an inability to resist.”121 This made it unlikely 
that compulsive gambling would qualify as insanity under the 
volitional prong of the American Law Institute (“ALI”) insanity test, 
the accepted test in most federal circuits at the time.122 In fact, 
numerous cases rejected compulsive gambling under the ALI 
volitional insanity test, noting the lack of acceptance among the 
scientific community that compulsive gamblers lack the capacity to 
conform their conduct to the requirements of the law.123 The simple 
conclusion to be drawn was that compulsive gambling, while perhaps 
making it more difficult to resist criminal behavior, was in no way 
thought to excuse it or cause it.124 
 
 121. See United States v. Torniero, 735 F.2d 725, 731 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 122. Id. The ALI approach was adopted into the Model Penal Code and allowed 
volitional impairments as an insanity defense when the defendant “lacks substantial capacity . . . 
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.” MOENSSENS ET. AL., supra note 62, 
at 1002. This approach supplemented M’Naghten’s Rule—a cognitive test only. The ALI 
approach was adopted by nearly all of the federal circuits, though sometimes with minor 
modifications. See Gov’t of V.I. v. Fredericks, 578 F.2d 927 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. 
Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 
1970); Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Leister, 393 
F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1968); United 
States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1967); Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th 
Cir. 1967); United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966); Wion v. United States, 
325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1963). The First Circuit also suggested use of the test in remanding a 
case in Beltran v. United States, 302 F.2d 48 (1st Cir. 1962). These cases were all overturned 
by the Insanity Defense Reform Act. See supra note 108. However, some circuits had already 
abandoned a volitional insanity test. See, e.g., United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 
1984). 
 123. See, e.g., United States v. Carmel, 801 F.2d 997, 999 (7th Cir. 1986) (rejecting 
testimony of compulsive gambling under the Frye test as irrelevant when the underlying crime 
was not gambling); United States v. Davis, 772 F.2d 1339, 1347 (7th Cir. 1985) (defendant 
failed to show “necessary support among the relevant professional and medical community for 
the proposition that compulsive gambling involves in some persons the inability to conform 
their conduct” to the law); United States v. Gould, 741 F.2d 45, 49–51 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(defendant failed to meet a test of “foundational relevance” by showing “substantial 
acceptance” that “pathological gambling may deprive some persons of the capacity to conform 
their conduct to the requirements of the law” at least where a non-gambling offense is 
involved); United States v. Torniero, 735 F.2d 725, 731–32 (2d Cir. 1984) (no showing of 
substantial acceptance among respected authorities in the mental health profession that a 
compulsive gambler is unable to resist the impulse to steal); United States v. Lewellyn, 723 
F.2d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1983) (defendant failed to make “required minimum showing . . . 
that some pathological gamblers lack substantial capacity to conform their conduct to the 
requirements of laws . . . .”). 
 124. The American Psychiatric Association wrote that “‘persons with antisocial 
personality disorders [such as compulsive gambling] should, at least for heuristic reasons, be 
STA-FIN 2/15/2003 2:59 PM 
385] Diminished Capacity Departures for Compulsive Gambling 
 411 
While the insanity cases were in the context of determining 
ultimate guilt rather than degree of punishment, the question is the 
same—whether compulsive gambling in some way overpowers the 
will of the individual.125 A gambling addiction may give a defendant 
a powerful motive for a crime but there is little evidence that it 
causes a loss of control beyond that exhibited by most people in 
prison. The Supreme Court noted, 
Prisons, by definition, are places of involuntary confinement of 
persons who have a demonstrated proclivity for anti-social criminal, 
and often violent, conduct. Inmates have necessarily shown a lapse 
in ability to control and conform their behavior to the legitimate 
standards of society by the normal impulses of self-restraint; they 
have shown an inability to regulate their conduct in a way that 
reflects either a respect for law or an appreciation of the rights of 
others.126 
B. Does Compulsive Gambling Cause Diminished Capacity? 
There is serious debate about the effects of compulsive gambling 
on the individual. For treatment and clinical purposes, the DSM-IV 
terms “pathological gambling” as an Impulse Control Disorder.127 
 
held accountable for their behavior.’” Torniero, 735 F.2d at 733 (quoting AMERICAN 
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION STATEMENT ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE, supra note 110, at 11). 
 125. It is not necessarily inconsistent for compulsive gambling to mitigate punishment 
while not completely excusing the crime: 
That compulsive gambling may lessen a convicted defendant’s punishment, though 
it may not constitute a defense precluding his or her conviction, engenders no 
inconsistency whatsoever. The liability phase of a criminal trial determines whether 
the defendant has committed an offense and, if so, whether there is a justification or 
excuse that warrants withholding blame for his or her actions. The purpose of 
sentencing, on the other hand, is to impose a just punishment, in light of the nature 
and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant. 
It is thus not surprising that, while a jurisdiction may reject a particular defense, it 
will allow the very same facts to provide a basis for the mitigation of sentence. 
Lustberg, supra note 39, at 73. This view is supported by the language of the guideline stating 
that the extent of the departure should reflect the extent to which the diminished capacity 
contributed to the crime. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13. It is also 
supported by the policy that punishment should comport with culpability. However, this does 
not resolve the difficulties in measuring volitional impairments, nor the fact, as discussed 
below, that gambling addiction may not in fact cause a lack of control when it comes to 
criminal behavior. 
 126. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984). 
 127. DSM-IV, supra note 5, at 312.31. Other impulse control disorders include 
kleptomania, pyromania, and trichotillomania (pulling out one’s hair). Id. The DSM-IV offers 
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Under the DSM-IV criteria, pathological gambling is diagnosed in a 
person who exhibits any five or more of the following factors: 
(1) is preoccupied with gambling . . . [;] 
(2) needs to gamble with increasing amounts of money in order to 
achieve the desired excitement[;] 
(3) has repeated unsuccessful efforts to control, cut back, or stop 
gambling[;] 
(4) is restless or irritable when attempting to cut down or stop 
gambling[;] 
(5) gambles as a way of escaping from problems or of relieving a 
dysphoric mood . . . [;] 
(6) after losing money gambling, often returns another day to get 
even . . . [;] 
(7) lies to family members, therapist, or others to conceal the 
extent of involvement with gambling[;] 
(8) has committed illegal acts such as forgery, fraud, theft, or 
embezzlement to finance gambling[;] 
(9) has jeopardized or lost a significant relationship, job, or 
educational or career opportunity because of gambling[; or] 
(10) relies on others to provide money to relieve a desperate 
financial situation caused by gambling[.]128 
 
a word of caution as to its use in the legal field: 
[I]nclusion here, for clinical and research purposes, of a diagnostic category such as 
Pathological Gambling does not imply that the condition meets legal or other 
nonmedical criteria for what constitutes mental disease, mental disorder or mental 
disability. The clinical and scientific considerations involved in the categorization of 
these conditions as mental disorders may not be wholly relevant to legal judgments, 
for example, that take into account such issues as individual responsibility, disability 
determination and competency. 
Id. at xxxvii. 
 128. Id at 312.31. Numbers (2), (4), (5), and (9) suggest that gambling addiction is 
similar to drug and alcohol addiction, forbidden factors under the guidelines. See infra Part 
V.C. 
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Only number three indicates an impaired ability to control 
behavior that one knows is wrongful, and even it speaks only of 
“unsuccessful efforts,” not inability or even impaired ability. In fact, 
even though classified as an impulse control disorder, there is little 
evidence that loss of control is a distinctive feature of pathological 
gambling.129 Many authors believe that “pathological gamblers do 
not really experience irresistible impulses and that they retain control 
over their behaviour.”130 Some studies suggest that personality and 
social attachment are more the cause of crime among gamblers than 
a gambling addiction.131 This makes compulsive gamblers who steal 
little different from other criminals who also generally exhibit a lack 
of willpower and not a lack of control. 
In sum, there are inherent dangers of misdiagnosis with 
volitional impairments, and there is serious disagreement as to 
whether compulsive gambling actually results in a loss of self-control. 
Because of this, courts should be wary of claims that compulsive 
gambling seriously impaired the gambler defendant’s ability to obey 
the law. Compulsive gamblers are worthy of sympathy, especially in 
light of the fact that the state often compounds their problem by 
promoting gambling. However, unless they can demonstrate more 
than a failure of will, they should not be granted a downward 
departure. Certain punishment may provide a counterbalancing 
effect to the otherwise powerful pull of pathological behavior. 
VI. INCOMPATIBILITY WITH OTHER GUIDELINE FACTORS 
This Comment argues that downward departures based on 
compulsive gambling should not be granted. This argument is 
partially based on the difficulty of diagnosing and measuring 
compulsive gambling disorders. There is at least one more reason to 
make such departures rare. Downward departures based on 
compulsive gambling are inconsistent with several other provisions of 
 
 129. See, e.g., Mark W. Langewisch & G. Ron Frisch, Classification of Pathological 
Gambling as an Impulse Control Disorder, ELEC. J. GAMBLING ISSUES, Nov. 14, 2000, 
http://www.camh.net/egambling (citing J.B. Murray, Review of Research on Pathological 
Gambling, 72 PSYCH. REP. 791 (1993)). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Dr. Gerhard Meyer, Pathological Gambling and Criminal Behavior, 10th 
International Conference on Gambling and Risk-Taking, Bremen Germany (June 4, 1997) in 
GAMBLING BEHAVIOR AND PROBLEM GAMBLING 517 (W.R. Eadington & J.A. Cornelius, eds. 
1998). 
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the Guidelines. Several of the other guidelines bear on departures 
based on compulsive gambling. Downward departures for 
diminished capacity are the exceptions to the rule that “[m]ental and 
emotional conditions are not ordinarily relevant”132 in determining 
sentencing departures. Allowing downward departures based on 
gambling addiction would also create severe conflict with the 
Guidelines’ treatment of drug and alcohol addiction. Finally, several 
of the gambling addicts who have received downward departures 
stole to pay off gambling debts, a seeming conflict with the 
Guidelines’ prohibition of departures based on economic need.133 
A. Similarity to Drug and Alcohol Addiction 
Pathological gambling is an inappropriate factor for 
consideration because of its similarity to drug and alcohol 
addiction—forbidden factors under the Guidelines.134 One 
commentator has noted that the Guidelines’ requirement “that the 
defendant’s ‘reduced mental capacity’ not be caused by the 
‘voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants’ [suggests] . . . that the 
drafters specifically sought to limit application of the [diminished 
capacity] provision to those who could not be deemed ‘responsible’ 
for their mental state.”135 If this is true then it applies equally to 
gambling addiction. 
“Pathological gambling, clinically speaking, is generally 
considered analogous to alcoholism and substance abuse as they are 
often present in the same people, as well as in the same families.”136 
Pathological gambling is often treated successfully in treatment 
programs with substance abusers.137 Clearly, gambling is different 
than substance abuse; however, 
 
 132. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.3 (2001). 
 133. Id. § 5K2.12; see, e.g., United States v. Sadolsky, 234 F.3d 938 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 134. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.4 (2001); see Langewisch & 
Frisch, supra note 129 (citing S.B. Blume, Compulsive Gambling and the Medical Model, 3 J. 
GAMBLING BEHAVIOR 237 (1987)). 
 135. Michael L. Perlin & Keri K. Gould, Rashomon and the Criminal Law: Mental 
Disability and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 431, 441 (1995). 
 136. Langewisch & Frisch, supra note 129 (citing Blume, supra note 134, at 237); 
Lesieur & Rosenthal, supra note 47, at 5; see also Stanton Peele, Is Gambling an Addiction Like 
Drug and Alcohol Addiction? Developing Realistic and Useful Conceptions of Compulsive 
Gambling (February 2001), at http://www.camh.net/egambling/. 
 137. Langewisch & Frisch, supra note 129. 
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what gamblers often describe as the sensation they experience while 
gambling is similar to the sensation substance abusers describe 
when using drugs or alcohol. Gambling, similar to drug and 
alcohol abuse, are [sic] all characterized by increases in tolerance, 
cravings and a consistent need to continue to take the drug or 
indulge in the behavior.138 
At least one circuit court, while refusing to review the district 
court’s discretionary decision not to depart downward, agreed with 
the district court that the “general purpose of deterrence would be ill 
served by discounting appellant’s sentence” on the basis of a 
gambling addiction because “such a dependence would be akin to 
drug or alcohol addiction.”139 
To distinguish between drug and alcohol addiction and 
gambling addiction does not serve a primary goal of the Sentencing 
Guidelines—uniformity.140 Drug and alcohol dependence are 
forbidden factors at least partly because “[s]ubstance abuse is highly 
correlated to an increased propensity to commit crime.”141 Further, 
drug and alcohol use cannot be used to argue diminished capacity 
because it is “voluntary.”142 Both reasons apply equally, if not more 
forcefully, to gambling addiction. In United States v. Katzenstein,143 
the court refused to grant a downward departure based on a 
gambling addiction and rejected the defendant’s contention that 
gambling addiction should be distinguished from drug and alcohol 
addiction. The court stated: 
The Sentencing Guidelines’ rationale for distinguishing between 
significantly reduced mental capacity (1) resulting from voluntary 
use of drugs or other intoxicants, and (2) resulting from other 
causes, is opaque. The only two clues to the rationale found in the 
Sentencing Guidelines are, first, the reference to the use of 
intoxicants as ‘voluntary,’ and, second, the statement that 
substance abuse is highly correlated to an increased propensity to 
commit crime.  
 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. United States v. Harotunian, 920 F.2d 1040, 1047 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 140. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (2001). 
 141. Id. § 5H1.4. 
 142. Id. § 5K2.13. 
 143. No. 90 CR 272 (KNW), 1991 WL 24386 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
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Defendant[] . . . has not convinced the court that compulsive 
gambling disorder can be distinguished in any [principled] way 
from abuse of drugs or alcohol.144 
The decision to gamble is as voluntary as the decision to use 
alcohol or drugs and both lead to an increased propensity to commit 
crime.145 As such, the reasons the Sentencing Commission has given 
for forbidding diminished capacity departures based on the voluntary 
use of intoxicants and for forbidding all departures based on drug 
and alcohol addiction apply just as forcefully to compulsive 
gambling. Unlike drug and alcohol use, there is no mental 
impairment associated with gambling addiction and, as discussed 
above, it is not clear that gambling addiction causes a loss of self-
control with respect to the resultant crime.146 Stealing to support a 
gambling habit is hardly distinguishable from stealing to support a 
drug or alcohol habit. To reward the gambling addict, who may in 
fact suffer from neither volitional nor cognitive impairment, while 
ignoring the chemical addict who often suffers from both, creates its 
own unwarranted disparity by making gambling addiction an 
encouraged factor for departure while leaving drug and alcohol 
addiction as forbidden factors. 
B. Contradiction with Other Guidelines Factors 
Departures based on gambling addiction conflict with at least two 
other provisions of the Guidelines. Downward departures based on 
mental and emotional conditions147 are discouraged while departures 
based on economic hardship148 are forbidden. Often times, compulsive 
 
 144. Id. at *2. But see Lustberg, supra note 39, at 68: 
[T]he fact that the Commission specifically barred the “voluntary use of drugs or 
other intoxicants” from contributing to the “significantly reduced mental 
capacity” . . . but did not treat gambling in the same manner, indicates its intention 
that gambling may be treated differently. That the Commission has not modified 
the Guidelines to explicitly account for compulsive gambling, as it has in light of 
other court decisions bearing upon the appropriateness of departure, is also 
indicative of the Commission’s acceptance of compulsive gambling as a potential 
basis for departure. 
 145. See supra Part III.B. 
 146. Even with drug addiction “there is an element of reasoned choice when an addict 
knowingly acquires and uses drugs; he could instead have participated in an addiction 
treatment program.” United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243, 245 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 147. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.3. 
 148. Id. § 5K2.12. 
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gamblers steal money not to gamble but to pay off gambling debts. The 
motive in such cases is economic need, not a compulsive need. For 
example, in United States v. Rosen,149 the trial court rejected a request 
for downward departure where the defendant committed theft in order 
to pay off a home equity loan.150 The loan was taken out to pay off 
gambling debts but the court noted that the Sentencing Commission 
prohibited departures based on personal financial difficulties.151 A need 
for money is hardly a novel motive, even if a more powerful one 
because of the addiction. 
In sum, one of the primary goals of the Guidelines was to 
promote uniformity and fairness.152 Downward departures based on 
gambling addictions undermine this goal. To make gambling 
addiction an encouraged factor for departure creates an unprincipled 
distinction between it and the Guidelines’ treatment of drug and 
alcohol use, economic need, and mental and emotional conditions. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Gambling addictions are real and tragic, and current social policy 
only encourages this dreadful phenomenon while doing little to treat 
it. However, punishment should comport with culpability. The 
evidence suggests that compulsive gamblers do not have an impaired 
ability to obey the law. Thus, when a judge grants a downward 
departure to a pathological gambler he may be simply pardoning the 
common criminal who simply has a powerful motive to steal. A 
“more compelling motive . . . is not the kind of direct causation  
 
 
 
 
 
 149. 896 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Askari, 
140 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 150. Id. at 790. 
 151. The trial court also found that “there was no link between compulsive gambling and 
criminal behavior.” Rosen, 896 F.2d at 791 n.2. The court in Roach also noted the conflict 
between the diminished capacity guideline and the prohibition of departures based on 
economic need when defendants steal money to satisfy a compulsion, but the Roach court did 
not resolve the issue since it was not raised. United States v. Roach, 296 F.3d 565, 571 n.4 
(7th Cir. 2002). 
 152. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996); see supra note 6 and accompanying 
text. 
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between mental capacity and commission of the offense envisioned” 
by the diminished capacity guideline.153 
Justin W. Starr 
 
 
 153. Venezia v. United States, 884 F. Supp 919, 926 (D.N.J. 1995). 
